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Atonement, Scapegoats, and the
Oxford Debating Society
Joe A. Thompson

"0 xford Atones" read a newspaper headline after the Oxford
Union Society defeated by 416 votes to 187 the motion "That this
House would not fight for Queen and Country" on 9 February
1983, exactly fifty years after the union had carried by 275 votes to
153 the resolution "That this House will in no circumstances fight
for its King and Country." Most commentators welcomed the
"atonement" of Oxford, where, as John Gray wrote in The Wall
Street Journal, "intellectual trends are first revealed." The second
Oxford debate was therefore "encouraging and even inspiring. It
showed signs that many of history's hard lessons had been
learned." 1
But for what was Oxford belatedly atoning? Why did
undergraduate debates receive so much attention? And what were
the "hard lessons" of history to be learned from the Oxford
episode?

For Max Beloff, the celebrated political writer and academician,
the second debate was occasion for personal atonement. In 1933,
as an undergraduate, he had spoken for the motion; in 1983, with
the certitude of hindsight, he had "a duty" to atone because the
original resolution had been "factually and morally" untrue. It
was factually false because many of those who had voted for the
proposition had died fighting in the Second World War. It was
morally false because the debate at Oxford had "in some slight
way" encouraged fascist belligerence by implying that Britain was
too anemic to fight. 2
For John Gray, and for other commentators who welcomed the
reversal of the outcome of the 1933 debate, Oxford had a far
heavier burden on its conscience. It rested on Winston Churchill's
interpretation of the "ever-shameful" motion. In June 1942
Churchill had allowed himself to be quoted as saying that "the
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effect of the Oxford resolution was shattering . . . to our prestige.
We have actual proof now that Mussolini was so affected by it that
he definitely came to the conclusion that Britain might be counted
out, and it is probable that it had a decisive effect on his decision
to bring in Italy on the side of Germany." 3 In his memoirs,
Churchill broadened the indictment: as a result of the motion, "in
Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Japan, the idea of a decadent,
degenerate Britain took deep root and swayed many
calculations." 4 In Churchill's view, the Oxford undergraduates had
an implied responsiblity for the Second World War.
Ironically, Churchill's son, Randolph, helped turn the Oxford
vote into a worldwide news story. Its organizers had no thought
of causing even a local stir. As Martin Ceadel, the historian of the
debate, has written, it was "an unremarkable Thursday-night's
relaxation at the Oxford Union" and the outcome was "most
simply" explained by the oratory of the invited speaker, C. E. M.
Joad, a popular philosopher and pacifist, and the union's
convention that "it is good debating that wins votes." 5 But a lively
piece of undergraduate entertainment became national news
when a senior editorial writer for the Daily Telegraph planted an
anonymous letter on the center-page of the Telegraph denouncing
the Oxford motion as "an outrage upon the memory of those who
gave their lives in the Great War."
The letter writer, J. B. Firth, suggested that "decently-minded
Young Oxford" should work without delay to get the "offensive
motion" expunged from the minutes of the Union Society.
Randolph Churchill acted on this suggestion. On 14 February he
circulated a letter to life members of the union demanding that
the offending motion be expunged from the minute book. But his
personal effort to save the honor of Oxford failed when on 2
March the union rejected by 750 votes to 138 a motion to expunge
the motion of 9 February. The vote was unrelated to the
sentiments of the original resolution but turned on Churchill's
effort to expunge a motion of the House. The Times summed up
the outcome with the headline: "The Oxford Union: Mr. R.
Churchill's Visit Resented."
Randolph Churchill's intervention made the Oxford debate a
major news story, but it was his father who insisted that it was an
event of historical importance. In his memoirs the episode
assumed legendary significance as an event that encouraged the
dictators to believe that the British would not fight. Historians
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have found little evidence to sustain Churchill's claim. Although
reports of the Oxford debate circulated in Germany, no one has
uncovered evidence that Hitler knew of the episode or was
influenced by it. Moreover, when Hitler embarked on an
adventurous foreign policy he did not need to draw upon an
undergraduate vote for encouragement: Britain's foreign and
defense policies throughout the 1930s led him to believe that he
would have a free hand in Europe.
Mussolini did read English, and had seen accounts of the
Oxford debate . According to Denis Mack Smith, fascist
propaganda magnified the Oxford vote "into the unanimous
opinion of students at Oxford and Cambridge, and then into a
pacifist vote by all British youth; and Mussolini refused to listen
to anyone who questioned this reasoning." 6 But Mussolini had a
more fundamental reason for dismissing Britain as a fighting
power. To his mind a growth in population was more important
than an increase in arms production in deciding which country
would win a major war. According to the Italian office of statistics,
Britain and France had declining populations, and Mussolini
believed that in twenty years their populations would be reduced
by almost half and be composed only of the old. For the same
reason he claimed that the United States would soon cease to be a
serious nation .7 For Mussolini, then, the Oxford vote was only a
symptom of a deeper and more fundamental weakness of British
society, and the undergraduate debate had no direct and serious
influence on his calculations.
II

But 1983 did more than give Lord Beloff and the Oxford Union
Society a chance to atone for past sins, real or imagined. It was a
time for preaching. The lesson to be learned, said Beloff, was that
nonviolence may be right for private citizens but it could never be
"the basis of national policy." Lord Hume, the former foreign
secretary, mixed indictment with admonition. He claimed that a
powerful and electorally influential pacifist movement, not Oxford
debaters, had hampered British defense preparations in the 1930s.
In 1983, he was fearful once again as he saw "unilateralists
sending out signals to a dictatorship that is mobilized with
enormous armed forces and practices its doctrine in
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and Poland." The implication was
21

THOMPSON

obvious: 1983 could become 1933 unless the neutralist movement
of the 1980s was denied the influence of the pacifist movement of
the 1930s. The latter had not prevented war and "left Britain
unprepared for it when it came." 8
Lord Beloff may be right about nonviolence; even most British
pacifists abandoned political claims for their beliefs in 1939 and
based their arguments solely on ethical grounds. And Lord Hume
may be justified in crying up the dangers of unilateral
disarmament in 1983. But their "lessons" of history are suspect for
two reasons. Firstly, their range of parallels is too limited. It is not
possible to argue, for example, that neutrality or non-alignment
will always endanger national and international security. The
examples of Switzerland and Sweden argue one way and those of
Belgium and Holland quite another. To draw a lesson from one
age or one country has obvious hazards. Moreover, their
generalizations about the 1930s do not inspire confidence because
they rest on a superficial historical analysis.
Three points must be made about military unpreparedness and
the "pacifists" of the 1930s. Firstly, it was budget-cutting
governments during the 1920s that left British services poorly
prepared for the 1930s. During Admiral Lord Beatty's term as First
Sea Lord (1919-1927), the Board of Admiralty repeatedly pleaded
to be allowed a small but steady building program which would
prevent the fleet from becoming obsolete, stop the loss of skilled
men from shipbuilding and armament industries, and avoid a
more expensive upsurge of construction when and if an
emergency arose. The Board of Admiralty was rebuffed and by
the early 1930s the sea-going fleet and defense industries were in
a parlous state. Naval historians have recorded the sad effects of
the "(almost) unilateral disarmament" of the 1920s. During the
Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936 the entire reserve of anti-aircraft
ammunition was sent to the Mediterranean fleet, leaving the
home fleet with none. In order to catch up in 1936 and 1937 the
Admiralty ordered armour plate from the Skoda works, but little
had been delivered before Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and
diverted British orders to his own forces. "You cannot build ships
in a hurry with a Supplementary Estimate," Lord Fisher had
warned years before, but this is what Britain tried to do in
1935- 1939. 9
Secondly, when commentators refer to a pacifist movement
with a "constituency of millions" during the 1930s, they are using
22
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the term "pacifist" to include those who sought to avoid war
through international cooperation, if necessary by the controlled
use of force, as well as those who believed that war was always
wrong. In the early 1930s the distinction between these anti-war
viewpoints was not often made but it is misleading if
commentators of the 1980s fail to do so. 10 It is possible that the
first group, the internationalists, were unrealistic about the
chances of disarmament by international agreement after Hitler
carne to power, especially after Germany left the Disarmament
Conference and the League of Nations in 1933, and about the
security system of the league, but they did not favor unilateral
disarmament and they did not oppose the use of force to deter
aggression and uphold international law.
Thirdly, the national government did not initiate supplementary
estimates before 1935 because its leaders feared that a "pacific
democracy" would reject a rearmament prograrn. 11 The politicians
simply waited until the public mood changed. But the
government's reading of public opinion before 1935 was not
necessarily correct. There was an upsurge of pacifist sentiment in
the early 1930s, and opposition parties berated the government
for the failure of the Disarmament Conference, but opinion polls
in 1934 reflected an anxious and confused rather than a strictly
pacific public.
In the spring of 1934 a number of Lord Rotherrnere's
newspapers polled readers for their views on the league,
disarmament, and rearmament in the air. The Bristol Evening
World concluded that the polls showed "a peaceful motive
underlying a desire for a strong defense." 12 The Rotherrnere
plebiscites were limited and local, but even the famous Peace
Ballot of 1934-1935, involving more than 1IY2 million voters, was
not, in spite of its popular name, a rejection of arms. Of particular
interest were the answers to the two parts of question five:'J
Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another,
the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by
(a) economic and non-military measures?
Yes: 10,096,626 (86.8%)
Doubtful:
No answer:
No:
636,195 ( 5.5%)
(b) if necessary, military measures?
23
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27,369 ( 0.2%)
862,707 ( 7.4%)

Yes:
No:

6,833,803 (58.7%)
2,366,184 (20.3%)

Doubtful:
41,058 ( 0.4%)
No answer: 2,381,485 (20.4%)

Winston Churchill later cited the returns on question five as
evidence that Britons were "willing and indeed resolved, to go to
war in a righteous cause," provided that all action was taken
under the auspices of the league. 14 Philip Noel-Baker, an ardent
supporter of the league, went further and claimed that the British
people were ready to fulfill their obligations under the covenant
and stop Mussolini by armed force if that was required. 15 These
judgments are suspect: the image of a stout-hearted people eager
to defend the league fitted too neatly with policy preferences of
Churchill and Baker. A perceptive observer, Harold Nicolson, an
experienced diplomat and member of Parliament, observed, soon
after the votes were in, that the ballot was not an expression of
national determination but an "expression of ill-considered
national desires. In other words, it expressed what the country
wanted to happen; it did not express what they were prepared to
do."l6
Still, the opinion polls of 1934 suggest that the government
might have adopted Churchill's strategy during the early 1930s: to
speak frankly and to campaign for 'Arms and the Covenant." The
public might have been reconciled to a rearmament program
linked to international obligations. Instead, the government
passively waited for events to educate the country. For this it
drew Churchill's celebrated rebuke: "I have heard it said that the
Government had no mandate for rearmament until the General
Election (in 1935). Such a doctrine is wholly inadmissible. The
responsibility of the Ministers for the public safety is absolute and
requires no mandate." 17 After 1935 the government could blame
neither the opposition nor a pacific public. It commanded
enormous majorities in Parliament ready to vote for any measure
of defense requested by the ministers.
III

The first Oxford fighting resolution was not meant to provoke
the public. It gained attention and notoriety only when critics
sought to expunge the motion. The worldwide publicity, followed
by Churchill's effort to discredit the debate, did much to create
the legend that the Oxford vote had influenced Mussolini and
24
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Hitler. The first myth gave rise to another, more general and
complex, that the "pacifists" were largely responsible for obliging
British politicians to negotiate with the dictators from weakness.
Both legends offered convenient scapegoats and diverted
attention from the fact that many, in and out of government, were
responsible for the failure to deter Hitler.
The recent Oxford debate shows how powerful is a certain view
of the 1930s; it holds in its grip the minds of many in Britain,
especially the survivors of the age. Their present frame of
reference is largely determined by what they believe occurred
during the previous years. The urge to draw lessons from the
1930s also betrays a strong and persuasive belief that the future
will closely parallel the recent past. But the popular view of the
1930s preached by those who recently welcomed the "atonement"
of Oxford rests on a false premise and inadequate information.
The victorious debaters of 1983, perhaps unwittingly, have placed
at the service of contemporary propagandists a shallow and
distorted history.
The Oxford debates do confirm one melancholy truth: that
failure creates a need for scapegoats. Therefore, if the politicians
miscalculate in the 1980s, as they did in the 1930s, there will be a
new search for scapegoats, and more speeches of atonement and
recrimination, perhaps in an Oxford Union debate of 2033.
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NOTES
'Wall Street Journal, 17 February 1983. Gray teaches philosophy at Jesus
College, Oxford.
2
These and other comments made on 9 February 1983 are gleaned
from various newspaper accounts. In time, surely, a full transcript of the
speeches will be printed .
3
Given in a speech by Lord Mottistone in the House of Lords. Hansard
132 (21 June 1944): 335.
•winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1, The Gathering
Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 85.
'The information in this paragraph, and the following, is taken from
Ceadel's article, "The 'King and Country' Debate, 1933: Student Politics,
Pacifism and the Dictators," The Historical Journa/22, no. 2 (1979),
397-422.
6
Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (New York: Knopf, 1982), 194-95.
'Mack Smith, Mussolini, 209.
8
The observation of John Gray, Wall Street Journal, 17 February 1983.
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"Naval problems and policy are discussed in Stephen W. Roskill,
Naval Policy between the Wars, 2 vols. (London: Collins, 1968-1976).
"'fhe distinction is clearly drawn by Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain
1914-1945: The Defining of A Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980),
especially in chapter one, "Pacifism and Pacificism."
"See John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London:
Longman, 1978), 342; and Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 5,
1922-1939 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 775-76 and 797-98.
12
Bristol Evening World, 21 April1934.
IJA fuller discussion is found in J. A. Thompson, "The Peace Ballot and
the Public," Albion 13, no. 4 (Winter 1981), 381-92.
••churchill, Gathering Storm, 170.
15
Philip Noel-Baker, The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932-33,
and Why It Failed (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), 141.
••Harold Nicolson, "British Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," Public
Opinion Quarterly 1 (1937): 59.
17
Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 5, 1922-1939, 796.
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